In a recent article the Dean of the new University of California, Irvine School of Law, Erwin Chemerinsky, discusses in a comprehensive and candid manner the recent founding of that law school and his vision for better incorporating skills training into top-tier legal education. 1 It is an ambitious project, and one certainly wishes Dean Chemerinsky and the other UC-Irvine founding faculty that are obviously strongly committed to this new vision of legal education the best in their endeavors. There are of course real questions whether such an effort at providing a truly distinctive form of legal education to top-flight students will survive the inevitable ebbing of the initial burst of enthusiasm that gave rise to the effort. There are also questions whether the new program will be able to successfully resist the financial pressures stemming from the increasingly stringent California state educational funding constraints that will probably make it impossible to continue to support student scholarship assistance at anywhere near the incredibly generous levels that were provided to the initial very small 2009-2010 and 2010-11 entering classes. 2 Given the relatively high annual tuition and fees charged by the UC-Irvine School of Law of over $40,000 year for California residents, and over $50,000/year for out-of-state residents, 3 a reduction in the availability of scholarship assistance over time may prove to be a significant impediment to their ambitions.
In this short paper I will not speculate upon the long-term prospects for this interesting experiment in legal education, but instead I will offer some concerns that I have regarding whether embracing such a skills-oriented focus will actually result in better trained lawyers, given the inevitable trade-offs involved.
Specifically, I want to call into question whether their overall curricular approach will be as effective in teaching first-year students basic contract law as is the more traditional doctrinal approach that is widely followed elsewhere in legal academia.
The UC-Irvine first-year curriculum, as described by Dean Chemerinsky, is centered around various analytical methods -common law analysis, statutory analysis, procedural analysis, constitutional analysis, and international legal analysis -rather than around doctrinal subject areas. 4 In their first fall semester students take a course titled "Common Law Analysis: Contracts" which as the name suggests is "primarily about the common law of contracts." 5 They also take a course titled "Statutory Analysis" which focuses on criminal law, and a course called "Procedural Analysis" which focuses on civil procedure. 6 In the subsequent spring semester they take "Common Law Analysis: Torts," which as the name suggests focuses upon tort law, and "Constitutional Analysis," and "International Legal Analysis." 7 The subsequent upper-level curriculum is largely elective, except for a writing requirement and a required clinical experience. 8 This clinical requirement is perhaps their most important skills-oriented innovation. 9 My major concern with this new approach is that while UC-Irvine's firstyear students will likely receive excellent and intensive instruction in both common law analysis and statutory analysis, both obviously essential lawyering skills, this methods-oriented approach may not provide students with an integrated, more holistic approach to any single doctrinal subject that would simultaneously expose them to both its common law and statutory aspects, and which would emphasize the connections and relationships between the case law and the statutes, and thus would arguably better prepare them for the many legal problems that require them to know both the relevant statutes and the case law and be able to effectively blend both forms of legal analysis.
My particular field of expertise is contract law, so let me use that area of law defense, and of course the bankruptcy defense, which is important in practice and will often will bar otherwise valid contractual claims, is wholly statutory. One simply has to address certain statutes in some detail to give students an adequate understanding of the range of and contours of the contract enforcibility defenses 9 that are potentially available.
The portion of the contracts course relating to contract interpretation, performance and breach is perhaps a bit more amenable to a common law-focused approach than are the previously discussed areas of contract law. However, UCC Article 2 in Sections 2-601 and 2-507 substitutes a different "perfect tender rule/seller cure rights" framework for the common law material breach analysis, and students who may later be involved in sale of goods litigation need to have some familiarity with these statutory provisions. In addition, the common law authority regarding the impracticability excuse defense has been largely displaced by UCC S. 2-615, which has had significant persuasive authority outside of the UCC.
Finally, as to remedies, a student's understanding of remedial law is certainly incomplete without at least some exposure to the various state and federal statutes that displace to a greater or lesser extent the common law rule that parties Contracts" classes in coming years will be experienced contract law professors who are well aware of the points I am here making, and doubtless they will attempt to incorporate statutory references and discussions into the class where this is necessary for educational purposes. But they will clearly be limited in their ability to present and explain those statutes, and to have the students spend time working with them, by the overarching and explicit common law analysis orientation of the class. Something will have to give here, and it will likely be the time usually devoted to statutory analysis in the contracts course. 13 The UC-Irvine analytical methods oriented approach to first-year legal education may ultimately prove to be superior to the more traditional doctrinal subject matter approach, all things considered, and particularly when it is assessed in the context of the innovative second-and third-year education that the school will be attempting to provide, but it appears to me that there may be something lost as well as something gained from pursuing that first-year approach, at least with regard to contract law instruction. 
